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Evidence and Analysis: The Iran-Contra Affair 
As seen through American, Middle Eastern, and Soviet news sources 
 
 
 In early November 1986 a small local newspaper in Lebanon broke a scandal that would 
cast dark shadows of suspicion on the Reagan Administration, call into question American global 
leadership, and further complicate power dynamics and loyalties in the Middle East. The 
international press quickly picked up the story of how the United States government had secretly 
arranged arms sales to Iran through Israel and used the profits to fund Nicaraguan contra rebels. 
In this arrangement, two separate American foreign policy schemes were joined in the 
expectation of mutual benefit. The United States backed the contra rebels who were fighting 
against the left-wing Sandinista government as part of its policy of preventing the spread of 
leftist movements around the globe. In Iran, the American government hoped to appease 
purported “moderates” in the Iranian government with arms sales in order to secure their help in 
effecting the release of American hostages held by pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon. This move 
was problematic in that the United States had, throughout the Iran-Iraq War, consistently urged 
its allies not to fuel the conflict by providing arms to either party. Additionally, by funding the 
contras, the Reagan Administration was circumventing the Boland amendments passed by the 
Democrat-controlled Congress, which prohibited several government agencies from providing 
military aid to the contras between December 1983 and September 1985. The Administration 
exploited a loophole in this legislation by using the National Security Council (NSC), which was 
not explicitly covered in the amendments, as the supervising body directing aid to the contras.1  
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Shortly after the scandal broke, NSC officials Robert Poindexter and Oliver North 
resigned and were fired, respectively. Higher officials in the government, including President 
Reagan himself, were also implicated, although it was unclear to what extent these officials were 
aware of or involved in the dealings. Reagan initially denied the operation had taken place at all; 
although a week later, he retracted the denial, acknowledging the operation but maintaining that 
the arms sales were not an arms-for-hostages deal. A presidential commission was soon 
convened to investigate, resulting in a number of convictions and serious discussions about the 
limits of the executive and the scope of congressional oversight in foreign affairs.2 
Both the American public and the international community were shocked by the 
revelation of the American scheme, which came to be popularly known as the Iran-Contra Affair. 
The full implications of any international event occurring in the rapidly globalizing world of the 
late 20th century cannot be understood without studying the event from multiple national 
perspectives. By examining news coverage of the scandal in the United States in comparison 
with the media of the Middle East—the region most directly affected by the deal; and the Soviet 
Union, the United States’ Cold War rival—we get a valuable cross-section of the meanings and 
implications of the event on the international stage. 
 
American Media Coverage 
Coverage of the Iran-Contra Affair in American newspapers presented the scheme in a 
highly national-centric light. The scandal was acknowledged as a major discredit to the 
American government, exposing significant internal issues. American reporting was largely 
centered on the local effects of the Affair’s revelation on the American people.  
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If the evolving press coverage of the incident was any indication, the scandal was a hard 
pill for the American public to swallow. Americans were unsure whom in their government they 
could trust. The Washington Post questioned whether or not President Reagan even knew of the 
deal, explaining that the American President is “constitutionally indispensable…So he must be 
protected, and at times that can mean protection even from significant knowledge.”3 Still, the 
article went on, “If the Iran/contra connection was just the result of a twisted application of the 
principle of deniability, it was atrocious enough.”4 Could it not be the President, someone within 
the government should have stood up and spoken out against this warping of policy. The Post 
called upon the President to accept or assign accountability, stating, “[Reagan] has a few weeks 
to act on Henry Kissinger’s principle: whatever must be revealed eventually should be revealed 
immediately.”5 As no one in the Administration seemed willing to offer the information the 
American public so desired and deserved, the American press took it upon itself to hold the 
government accountable. 
Writers for The New York Times and the Washington Post repeatedly leveled the charge 
that the American government was not serving its citizens properly. In an article dated 
November 30th, 1986, the Post laments, “There’s little sign of recognition that the most fragile 
and most precious political commodity is at risk: the public’s trust in its Government.”6 This 
sentiment is echoed in another Washington Post piece profiling the first American hostage 
released from Lebanon after the arms-for-hostages deal was initiated. The former captive, 
Reverend Benjamin Weir is quoted as saying he “regretted the ‘trading of arms for hostages,’ 
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calling it a ‘questionable tactic,’” and stating that he would not want an escalation of the Iran-
Iraq War as a result of hostages being released.7  
By presenting the viewpoint of one of the hostages himself, the newspaper used Reverend 
Weir as a mouthpiece for the American people. Weir, described only by his rather ordinary 
profession, represents the average American; thus, the reader takes his view as representative of 
that of the public as a whole. Yet Weir is also extraordinary in that he found himself caught up in 
the middle of an international conflict and scandal—an experience that would likely radicalize 
even the most rational among us. It is perhaps expected that he would support nearly any means 
necessary to secure the release of hostages, yet he stands with the rest of the American people in 
denouncing the arms-for-hostages deal. In offering the Reverend and former hostage’s take on 
the situation, the Washington Post emphasizes how deeply misaligned the United States 
government’s covert deal with Iran was with the preferences of its citizens.  
The American media also presented the Iran-Contra Affair as a symptom of a 
government that was not functioning the way it should. As a nation that sees itself as a “city on a 
hill” and prides itself on its unique brand of democracy—which it has, historically, even felt the 
moral obligation to export to other nations, such a scandal was unacceptable to the United States. 
The press searched for an explanation within the American democratic framework. A November 
11th, 1986 article in The New York Times reported that the official Iran strategy approved by the 
United States government involved securing Iran’s agreement to stop exporting terrorism and 
revolution and begin negotiations to end the Iran-Iraq War, however “the checks and balances 
broke down”8 and this strategy was neglected. One government official interviewed for the story 
blamed the departure from policy on the National Security Council, which had circumvented 
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other major governmental departments that should have been involved and would have better 
understood and prevented the consequences of negotiating with terrorists.9 Not only had the 
scandal shocked and outraged the public, but it had also divided the government. As the 
mouthpiece of a nation committed to democratic ideals, American journalists exposed and 
denounced the evils of corruption it had found in the government that was meant to inspire both 
its own citizens and others throughout the world. It is interesting to note that two reputable 
American newspapers, The New York Times and the Washington Post made the effort to 
highlight the voices of outrage that came from within the government itself. This was likely done 
in an attempt to preserve the faith of the American people and of the international community in 
the existence of American politicians committed to justice, honesty, and the policies that the 
nation had so vehemently espoused. 
Secondarily, the American media zeroed in on what the Iran-Contra Affair would mean 
for America’s reputation on the international stage. In a November 11th, 1986 article, The New 
York Times questioned what the revelation of the arms-for-hostages deal would mean for 
“America’s credibility abroad [and] the coherence of its foreign policy.”10 By undermining some 
of its own key policy objectives, the Times acknowledged that the American government had 
upset and confused its allies—especially friendly Arab nations, about the nature of its true 
intentions. “American credibility was damaged among moderate Arab nations, which the 
Administration needs as a buffer in its efforts to curb terrorism,”11 the same article laments. It is 
interesting to note that this effect of the fallout was discussed significantly less frequently and 
less thoroughly in American press than the internal consequences. This coverage also focused 
mostly on how international connections and perceptions of the United States would suffer, 
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rather than how other nations would be affected by the knowledge of the deal or by the Iranian-
American relationship itself. 
 
Middle Eastern Media Coverage 
 Unlike the American press, media sources in the Middle East reacted to the breaking of 
the Iran-Contra Affair with an attitude of smug acceptance, as if they had expected something 
like this to come out for some time. Such a scandal aligned with and vindicated the pervasive 
distrust of American credibility that prevailed throughout many Middle Eastern states. Quoted in 
the Damascus Domestic Service, Syrian Foreign Minister responded to the news by stating “We 
in Syria never believed that the United States has credibility with the Arabs…we hope that the 
Arab states that have now discovered the United States’ lack of credibility will pursue their 
policies in the future on the basis of that belief.”12 The Iraqi media also reported that Iraqis 
remained unshaken by the news, acknowledging that the admission by the United States “proves 
Iraq’s announcements about the suspicious and aggressive ties between the charlatan group in 
Iran and Zionism.” Iraqi reporters went on to assure their audience that Iraq was not intimidated 
by the trifecta, and would “continue to insist on defending the homeland and its sacred soil 
against the aggression of the unjust group in Iran” as it had been doing.13 
 Newspapers throughout the Middle East tied the United States’ deal with Iran to 
American imperialist tendencies in the Middle East. A Turkish report asserted, “all [Reagan’s] 
realities are based on the globalist doctrines of the greatest imperialist state’s ruling circles who 
consider all other countries and peoples pawns in their hegemonistic policies.”14 In early 
December 1986, Lebanese newspaper Al-Nahar al-’Arabi Al-Duwali backed this idea by running 
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an interview with the former Iranian President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, in which Bani-Sadr 
dismissed the ideas that the Iran-Contra scandal was especially newsworthy and that the safe 
return of hostages in Lebanon was even among the primary goals of the United States in the 
region. Rather, according to Bani-Sadr, America had greater ambitions, including: gaining 
control of OPEC, “replacing Saddam Husayn, establishing an Iranian regime close to the United 
States, and controlling the terrorist groups.”15 The hostages-for-arms deal, which was viewed as 
a major news event in the United States, was seen by Middle Easterners as just another step in a 
series of American actions towards establishing an imperial relationship with Iran and expanding 
its sphere of influence and control across the entire Middle Eastern region.  
 Along with these outdated imperialist tendencies, Middle Eastern media also discussed 
the United States’ interactions with Iran in terms of a Cold War framework. As a major global 
center of oil, the Middle East was considered an extremely important sphere of influence and had 
been the theater for a number of Cold War power plays. As such, Middle Eastern states were 
understandably suspicious of any Soviet or American actions in the region, and the revelation of 
the American-led Iran-Contra scheme was no different. While expressing some bemusement at 
the shock that accompanied the exposure of American-Iranian contacts, one Turkish news source 
expressed the idea that the United States government was in fact turning the news to its 
advantage, further advancing its Cold War, neo-imperialist agenda. The article argued that the 
American government “want[ed] to prove now that nothing has changed…and that when the 
need arises even Khomeyni goes to them asking for assistance. Thus, the Americans want to 
convince the Third World, especially Islamic countries, that there is no alternative to alignment 
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with the United States or the Soviet Union.”16 Albeit somewhat paranoid, this concern was not 
without validity. Although the revelation of the arms-for-hostages deal hurt the United States’ 
credibility both at home and abroad, it did little to diminish perceptions of American power. 
Despite some susceptibility to smaller-scale terrorist operations, the admission of US-Iranian 
contacts reminded the world, and especially the Middle East that the United States still had a 
monopoly on traditional hard power and the ability to affect the perpetuation and likely outcome 
of conflicts even far from home. 
 Suspicions such as these were not inconsistent with widespread Middle Eastern 
impressions of the United States, as reinforced by the arms-for-hostages scandal and colorfully 
depicted in the press. The secret dealings of the American government and its duplicity towards 
its own citizens meant that the United States was branded by the Middle Eastern media as 
immoral and deceptive. In a November 25th, 1986 commentary, Our Radio in Turkey announced 
that “Reagan’s national security adviser, Poindexter, said with no shame: Lying is a legitimate 
tool in foreign policy.”17 The Damascus Domestic Service agreed with this depiction, reporting,  
“The attainment of U.S. interests was not always sought through moral and principled means.”18 
 The United States was also characterized as inconsistent and hypocritical. The nation that 
was perhaps the most outspoken champion of anti-terrorism had “turned state terrorism into a 
principle of its foreign policy” 19 by militarily supporting Iran—a country frequently identified as 
exporting terrorism. After seeing how the American government had abandoned its policy 
against negotiating for hostages, former Iranian President Bani-Sadr told a Lebanese newspaper, 
“[Americans] are capable of making a 180-degree turn in their policy.” The American 
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government’s use of the revenues from its controversial arms sales to support the Contra war 
against the government of Nicaragua and similar insurgencies in “several other freedom loving 
countries” with Leftist leanings were also emphasized as contradictions of the nation that 
professes itself a promoter of freedom around the globe. 20  
To make matters worse, not only had the United States abandoned its policies, but it had 
done so while continuing to compel its friends to hold to these policies. While the United States 
was clandestinely arranging for Iran to receive renewed military supplies, it was simultaneously 
“[forcing] its allies not to have anything to do with Iran.”21 The Middle Eastern media seized 
onto this instance of American flip-flopping and used it to characterize the United States as an 
international bully, using its power to coerce others into adhering to certain norms or policies, 
while neglecting to do so itself.  
 Taking it a step further, Middle Eastern presses attacked the American democratic system 
as well. Turkish media dismissed the claims of “bourgeois politicians” that “the principle of 
democracy is carefully protected and everything is done out in the open.” Rather, the report 
claims, “the bourgeois democracy is nothing but a cover behind which the imperialist class hides 
to carry out arbitrary operations and brutality both in domestic and in foreign policy.”22 Middle 
Eastern coverage of the Iran-Contra scandal discussed the event in terms that demonized the 
political system that had fostered such moral decay and corruption. Turning the tables on the 
country that has long purported to be a model of moral and political ideology—ideologies it 
continues to try to export to regions like the Middle East—the Middle Eastern media raised 
questions about the perceived superiority of American systems. 
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 Yet it was certainly not only the United States that received backlash in Middle Eastern 
press coverage of the Iran-Contra Affair; Iran was also harshly attacked for its relations with the 
“arch Satan.”23 Middle Eastern nations criticized Iran’s participation with Israel in the scheme, 
accusing the Islamic nation of being a supporter of Zionism, and thus a traitor, to Islamic nations 
and true Muslims everywhere. In a speech by Iraqi President Saddam Husayn transcribed in the 
Baghdad Voice of the Masses, Husayn called the “cooperation with those claiming to be patriotic 
Muslims and those claiming to seek the Liberation of Jerusalem” “shameful” and “dirty.”24 A 
second Iraqi article, in the Baghdad Domestic Service labeled the tripartite Iran-Contra Affair an 
act of “Zionist-imperialist-Khomeyniite” hostility to our struggler Arab nation.”25 Husyan used 
this now-confirmed relationship between Iran and Israel as further proof of the justification for 
the Iran-Iraq War, even claiming that Iran had been “brainwashing” the soldiers they sent to 
battle and “try[ing] to create a certain romanticism about holy Jerusalem and its special status in 
the hearts of some Iranians.”26 In this way, Husayn hoped to vilify and delegitimize the Islamic 
revolutionary regime in Iran and increase support for the Iraqi war effort.  
 
Soviet Media Coverage 
Soviet coverage of the Iran-Contra Affair framed United States actions largely within a 
Cold War context. Necessarily, much of the reporting is heavily critical of the United States and 
the Soviet media capitalized on the opportunity to present its own nation as the alternative moral 
superpower. Soviet coverage of the unfolding scandal betrayed a tinge of Cold War paranoia 
towards the state’s competitor for global and ideological hegemony. A November 30th, 1986 
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article speculated, “what has been revealed so far is just the tip of the iceberg.”27 The article 
warned that the details coming out suggested that the United States and Israel did not act alone; 
rather, NATO allies and American-friendly European nations also participated in supplying arms 
to Iran as well. The Moscow Izvestiya deduced that the issue of the hostages was only a small 
part of the reason the United States was supplying military aid to Iran. This article argued that 
the primary purpose behind the United States support of the Iranian military effort was 
“returning to the country which shares a border with the Soviet Union and which was at one time 
considered by the United States to be its own domain.”28 
In response, Soviet press heavily emphasized the hypocrisy in the United States’ deal 
with the Iranians. Beyond the glaring contradiction between the United States’ professed policy 
against negotiating with terrorists and the trading of arms for hostages, the Soviets attacked the 
contradictions in the United States’ presentation of itself as a moral authority and leader of a 
new, post-war world order. The Moscow TASS International Service chided the United States as 
“active participants in supplying death arms to the conflict region between Iran and Iraq, which 
[could] lead to further destabilization of the situation in this region in the world, which is 
explosive even without this.” The article went on to criticize the United States’ support for the 
Nicaraguan contras, pointing out that the action constituted infringement on Nicaraguan national 
sovereignty and on the security of other peoples and states of the region as well.29 The Moscow 
Izvestiya calls attention to another example of the American government violating another global 
norm advocated widely by the United Nations and the United States; the right of self-
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determination. The newspaper points out that the United States-Israel partnership has been trying 
to deny this right to Arab Palestinians and prevent them from forming their own state.30 
Soviet media condemned these actions of the United States as part of a larger pattern of 
“neogobalism”31 and imperialist tendencies. The Soviet press explained that renewing the 
Iranian’s stock of arms perpetuated the Iran-Iraq War, which fit in “perfectly with the military-
political and strategic designs of the United States and Israel in the region.”32 Emphasizing the 
United States’ role in perpetuating conflict in the already unstable Middle East and supporting 
rebels working to destabilize a legitimate regime in Latin America, the Soviet presses worked to 
portray the United States as an arrogant, manipulative meddler, which put its own international 
interests above the national interests of other nations. 
Setting up the United States as the international bad guy, the Soviet media offered its own 
government as the alternative good guy in international affairs. In an article discussing the role of 
entanglements of the United States with Iran, the Soviet press asserts “it is possible to state that 
the policy of diversionary maneuvers and separate deals merely leads to the endless 
postponement of a Near East settlement.” It is clear what “separate deals” the article is referring 
to, published just weeks after the Iran-Contra scandal first broke. In the same piece denouncing 
the American-led “dirty business” of supplying arms to fuel conflict in the Middle East, the 
Izvestiya slipped in a reference to the Soviet Union’s “constructive proposal” made at the 41st 
session of the UN General Assembly to begin work to set up a conference on the Near East to 
figure out a solution to the Israeli/Palestinian problem.33 In this piece, the Izvestiya effectively 
contrasted its portrayal of the the United States as a powerful, but dangerously self-interested 
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international actor, with its depiction of the Soviet Union as a global superpower genuinely 
acting in the best interests of the international community. 
Beyond the United States’ international missteps, Soviet newspapers condemned 
American internal handling of the affair as well. Likening the scandal to Watergate, the Moscow 
TASS called the establishment of an committee to investigate “Irangate” “clearly…an attempt to 
bring down the storm of criticism against the administration.”34 In Soviet eyes, the American 
administration was more concerned with saving face than with honesty and good governance.  
President Ronald Reagan suffered particularly harsh treatment in the Soviet press. He 
was attacked as an unreliable and selfish leader, who, according to reports “actually tried to 
disassociate himself further from any complicity in the scandal. He said that he would like the 
commission to concentrate on the NSC staffers.”35 The President was seen by the Soviets as a 
coward, forcing lower-ranking officials to take the fall for a scheme in which he was likely 
involved, and manipulating evidence to save his own reputation. The Moscow Domestic Service 
reported that “Poindexter and North were the tools of [a hypocritical] policy and they were 
removed certainly not because Washington is abandoning this policy, but only because it took an 
especially scandalous turn and it was necessary to divert the blame onto scapegoats.”36 The 
Moscow TASS took the accusations even further, reporting that “the U.S. President frankly 
intimated what conclusion he was awaiting from commission members: to whitewash the 
administration and to pass off ‘Irangate’ as an affair of ‘individual’ staff members of the 
National Security Council who got out of control of the leaders.”37  
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In these portrayals, Soviet news sources attacked the ethics of the American leader, 
damaging the moral authority of the nation as a whole. It is also interesting to note how the 
Soviet coverage emphasizes the individual—primarily, the character of Reagan, but also the 
importance of his scapegoats as being “individual” staff members. This reflects the emphasis on 
individuality and the power of one in American culture, which proves in this instance to be a 
double-edged sword that Reagan tries and fails to escape—at least according to the Soviet 
interpretation. 
 
Coverage Comparison 
As details of the Iran-Contra Affair emerged, international media sources provided telling 
glimpses of how their audiences perceived the event and what it meant to both their national 
interests and global dynamics. Examining how the press in the United States, the Middle East, 
and the Soviet Union represented the situation, certain trends emerge. While the United States 
media expressed shock and outrage at the discovery that its government was negotiating with 
terrorists and aiding the Iranian war effort, most Middle Eastern newspapers were already aware 
of some level of collusion—or simply considered this departure from professed policy and 
betrayal of trust quite in character for the amoral United States. Newspapers based in both the 
Soviet Union and the Middle East also centered their coverage on the larger context of the 
scandal, namely the cooperation between the United States and Iran; American media, on the 
other hand, seemed obsessed with the specific discovery of the scandal itself. Additionally, 
American coverage of the event was also extremely internally focused, with barely any column 
space given to the international repercussions of the arrangement. Soviet newspapers, on the 
other hand, placed a heavy emphasis on how the United States was perpetuating conflict and 
instability in the Middle East, and threatening the universal right of self-determination in Latin 
America. Both Middle Eastern and Soviet news sources placed the Iran-Contra Affair in the 
context of the Cold War and America’s “neo-imperialist” aspirations for influence and control 
throughout the world.  
While the United States media made efforts to hold the American government 
accountable for abandoning its professed policy and deceiving its citizenry, it also worked to 
assure its audience of the presence of moral and honest politicians in the government. Both 
Middle Eastern and Soviet newspapers, however, took the opportunity to emphasize the negative 
aspects of the United States government and diplomacy, often comparing the American 
government with their nations’ own to make their governments to look better by comparison. 
American newspapers also framed the scandal as resulting from a failure to adhere to noble 
democratic principles, while Middle Eastern sources used the outcry to discredit the democratic 
system as a whole. It is also interesting to note that, while both American and Soviet newspapers 
focused on reporting objective facts (which are naturally tinged by bias in style of reporting and 
in what facts they choose to include), much of Middle Eastern reporting surrounding the Iran-
Contra Affair consisted of interviews, transcriptions, or commentaries of speeches by Middle 
Eastern politicians or officials. 
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